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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
W. B: RUSSELL, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY AND 
DEPOT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7647 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
As stated by plaintiff in the first sentence of his an-
swering brief, there is no dispute between the parties 
with respect to the facts and we will refrain in this reply 
brief from all unnecessary reference thereto. 
The plaintiff has followed the pattern of the defend-
ant's main brief in discussing the case under Points I to 
VII, inclusive, and we will adhere to this arrangement al-
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though we do not consider it necessary to reply to the 
matters discussed by plaintiff under all seven points of 
issue. 
POINT I. 
Our position in connection with this assignment was 
that the court erred in admitting the transcript of the 
proceedings at the official investigation as substantive 
evidence of the facts therein stated, and in connection 
therewith we complain at a later point in the brief of the 
court's deciding the case solely and exclusively upon this 
improperly admitted evidence. We think that the case of 
Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawana & Western Railroad Co., 
339 U. S. 239, 94 L. Ed. 534, 70 S. Ct. 577, has firmly 
established the procedure to be followed by state and 
federal courts in handling controversies under collective 
bargaining agreements with carriers. The plaintiff has 
devoted considerable space in his brief to explaining the 
holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
Slocum case. As we understand plaintiff's contention, it 
is that the holding in the Slocum case does not limit the 
jurisdiction of trial courts merely to the hearing of an 
ordinary common law action for damages for breach of 
contract under the type of contract in question. This case 
is the same as Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 
630, 85 L. Ed. 1089, 61 S. Ct. 754, in that it is a simple 
common law action for breach of contract. The plaintiff 
endeavors to make a distinction between the Moore case 
and the Slocum case and Order of Railway Conductors v. 
Southern Railway Co., 339 U. S. 255, 94 L. Ed. 542, 70 
S. Ct. 585, on the grounds that the two latter cases in-
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volved jurisdictional disputes. The Supreme Court of the 
United States in the Slocum case specifically eliminated 
room for any such distinction. It discussed the Moore case 
extensively in its efforts to carefully explain just what 
was held in the Slocum case. We have covered this matter 
fairly completely, but because counsel undertakes to tell 
us what the Supreme Court held we would like again to 
refer to the language of the Court itself where it is said: 
"Our holding here is not inconsistent with our 
holding in Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. 
S. 630. Moore was discharged by the railroad. He 
could have challenged the validity of his discharge 
before the Board, seeking reinstatement and back 
pay. Instead he chose to accept the railroad's action 
in discharging him as final, thereby ceasing to be 
an employee, and brought suit claiming damages for 
breach of contract. As we there held, the Railway 
Labor Act does not bar courts from adjudicating such 
cases. A common law or statutory action for wrong-
ful discharge differs from any remedy which the 
board has power to provide and does not involve 
questions of future relations between the railroad 
and its other employees." * * * 
"We hold that the jurisdiction of the Board to 
adjust grievances and disputes of the type here in-
volved is exclusive. The holding of the Moore case 
does not conflict with this decision, and no contrary 
inference should be drawn from any language in the 
Moore opinion." 
The case before this court differs in no particular at 
all from the issues presented and finally adjudicated in the 
Moore case and we therefore think that this court is bound 
by the application of the Slocum case as the Supreme Court 
of the United States says it should be made. The Supreme 
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Court of the United States took occasion to point out that 
the New York Court of Appeals fell into the error of assum-
ing state courts had the right to adjudicate disputes arising 
out of a carrier-union collective bargaining agreement, 
which is the ultimate result of the distinction which plain-
tiff in his brief is trying to make. Mr. Justice Black in re-
versing, stated: 
"The majority (of the New York Court of Ap-
peals) thought that our opinion in Moore v. Illinois 
Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630, left state courts free 
to adjudicate disputes arising out of a carrier-union 
collective bargaining agreement without obtaining 
the Board's interpretation of that agreement." 
Counsel for the plaintiff cite a number of cases at pages 
13, 14 and 15 of their brief in their effort to nullify this 
language in the Slocum case. It should be pointed out, how-
ever, that these cases were all decided before the Slocum 
case and the courts in the cited cases thought they were 
following Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., as the New York 
Court of Appeals did, and were making the same mistake in 
doing so. 
Apparently the reason for the plaintiff's strenuous ef-
fort to establish that the Slocum case has no application is 
because of his concern over the provision of the contract 
which he contends provides the measure of damages for 
breach. The contract does not provide that upon breach 
thereof the plaintiff shall be paid for all time lost, but it 
provides for the payment of all time lost upon his rein-
statement to his former employment. For this reason plain-
tiff contends in the face of the Slocum case that the trial 
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court had a right to reinstate and therefore had a right to 
award damages "for all time lost." If the court had a right 
to reinstate and did not reinstate, why then did it award the 
plaintiff "all time lost?" 
On the precise matter involved under Point I, namely, 
that the court erred in admitting the unsworn transcript 
as substantive evidence and the corollary thereof, viz, re-
fusing to allow the defendant to introduce any evidence 
whatsoever as to the merits of its action in discharging 
plaintiff, we cited the cases of Tennison v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry. Co., ... Mo .... , 228 S. W. 2d 718, and John-
son v. Thompson, . . . Mo. . .. , 236 S. W. 2d 1. Both of 
these cases support our position and we confess that we 
were unable to find any others in the books. We did not find 
any to the contrary and counsel for the plaintiff has cited 
none. Here again the plaintiff, unable to find any law in 
support of his position, attempts to distinguish these cases 
from the present case. The agreement before this court 
provides, "No yardman will be suspended or dismissed with-
out first having a fair and impartial hearing and his guilt 
established." The agreements involved in the cited cases 
provided that, "Trainmen shall not be suspended, discharg-
ed, or unfavorable entries made against their records with-
out just and sufficient cause." Counsel even suggests that 
just and sufficient cause under the latter cases can be 
found without an investigation. The fact of the matter is 
that investigations were held in both cases and it is well 
known to all with any acquaintance with agreements under 
the Railway Labor Act, that under all types of collective 
bargaining agreements between carriers and employes, 
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hearings are contemplated and are held where violations are 
charged and where it is anticipated discipline may be as-
sessed. We are unable to see any distinction of substance 
between the expressions "his guilt established" and "with-
out just and sufficient cause." Whatever the language used, 
these agreements all presuppose the right of management to 
discipline its employes for violation of not only its operat-
ing rules, but to discipline them for many things not specifi-
cally provided for. As the citations in our main brief show, 
the Railway Labor Act never contemplated that manage-
ment should be deprived of the right to discipline its em-
ployes and to dismiss them for any cause sufficient to the 
management, so long as the management did not act arbi-
trarily and in bad faith. Does the expression "his guilt 
established" mean to the satisfaction of the employe or 
the employer and the employe both? It would be ridiculous 
to suppose that it did. Does it mean then that his guilt must 
be established to the satisfaction of the management "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" or "by a preponderance of the 
evidence?" There is no basis whatever in court decisions or 
the holdings of the National Railroad Adjustment Board for 
so concluding. In our main brief we cited a number of hold-
ings of the Railroad Adjustment Board itself, wherein 
they have consistently taken the position that even though 
they had been sitting upon the matter in the original instance 
and would have decided the case otherwise or imposed a 
different or less severe penalty, they will not disturb the 
decision of management or the penalty imposed unless it 
clearly appears that the management in acting as it did, did 
so arbitrarily and in bad faith. The attempt to apply strict 
legal procedure to hearings which are conducted by laymen 
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and to a review thereof by the courts is wholly unwar-
ranted and has never been contemplated in connection with 
collective bargaining agreements under the Railway Labor 
Act. Generally, the principles and the decisions of courts 
have furnished valuable guides in determining the reciprocal 
rights and duties of the parties under such agreements, but 
the subject matter being dealt with and the fact that laymen 
on both sides are attempting to adjust their disputes, 
necessitates some indulgence rather than strict adherence to 
legal principles. This is the underlying philosophy of the 
Slocum case. In asking for a strict legal approach against 
the defendant, counsel ignores this underlying philosophy. 
Plaintiff in this action has throughout, successfully sought 
the widest indulgence for himself and has insisted upon and 
secured the strictest sort of technical compliance with the 
contract on the part of the defendant company. In our main 
brief we pointed out that the rule of strict construction 
against the defendant is unwarranted for the reason that 
defendant did not draw the contract. It was drawn around 
a conference table by the parties, where neither had any 
advantage over the other. 
But even so, there was substantial competent evidence 
at the investigation warranting the action of the defendant 
in dismissing plaintiff and on familiar principles applicable 
to decisions of administrative boards, which defendant's 
management is not, the court should not disturb the find-
ings. The plaintiff in his brief says that there is nothing 
involved in this case except the question of whether or not 
the plaintiff absented himself without written leave for a 
period in excess of ten days. He adds, gratuitously, the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
expression "wilfully or knowingly." We agree, except 
that there is no room for injecting into this case under the 
contract any claim that the defendant must establish plain-
tiff so absented himself "wilfully and knowingly." These 
words do not appear any place in the contract. What are 
the facts? We do not propose to rehash the matter, but there 
is absolutely no question but that the plaintiff was off the 
job in excess of ten days without written permission, which 
he knew was necessary to obtain and which he did not 
obtain and made no effort to obtain. The entire case is that 
simple and on the basis of that showing alone, which was 
admitted by the plaintiff himself at the hearing and is un-
disputed now, the management was justified in dismissing 
him, and there is no evidence whatsoever that such action 
was taken arbitrarily or in bad faith so as to warrant its 
reversal. 
POINT II. 
The plaintiff in his brief has little to say about this 
point wherein we contend that the court should have granted 
defendant's motion for a nonsuit. If we are right in our 
contention that the trial court committed error in admitting 
the transcript of the unsworn testimony at the investigation 
as substantive evidence of the facts therein stated, or wrong 
therein, but right in our contention that it did not support 
a finding that the management acted arbitrarily and in bad 
faith in dismissing plaintiff, then of course the nonsuit 
should have been granted. If we are right in either of these 
contentions, the record was absolutely destitute of any evi-
dence which would support a cause of action. We would 
like to remark in passing that we think the evidence at the 
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close of the plaintiff's case was absolutely destitute of any 
evidence of damage. Counsel for plaintiff make the state-
ment under Point II of their brief that it was admitted by 
the parties that "under the collective bargaining agreement 
defendant's right to discharge was limited by the provisions 
of Rule 38." We do not recall ever having made such a 
ridiculous admission and we have been unable to find in 
the record where we have done so. It is not the fact, and 
we have never admitted it to be the fact. Plaintiff argues 
the existence of the agreement and the fact of discharge 
alone "make out a prima facie case fo:r recovery." Plain-
tiff also contends under this point that the burden was upon 
the defendant to establish that the discharge was in accord-
ance with the contract. This is an argument of desperation, 
made in an effort to justify the palpable error committed in 
refusing to grant defendant's motion for a nonsuit, and is 
undeserving of further comment. 
POINT III. 
Our contention here that the court erred in limiting 
!he evidence upon the question of breach solely to what 
appeared in the unsworn transcript of the testimony a~ th~ 
9fficial investigation and in refusing to permit the defend-
ant to prove that parts of the plaintiff's testimony even in 
this transcript were false, is, we believe, sufficiently covered 
in our main brief and herein under Point I to make it un-
necessary to elaborate further upon this matter. 
POINT IV. 
In answer to our contention that the court in any event 
should have allowed as a deduction the sum of $7,774.39, 
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10 
which we managed to prove had been earned in other em-
·ployment by the plaintiff, the plaintiff contends that the 
parties had stipulatedin the contract that damages for 
breach thereof involving plaintiff's dismissal would be 
measured by "all time lost." We have no quarrel with plain-
tiff on the legal proposition that parties to a contract may 
stipulate therein as to the measure of damages in the event, 
and only in the event, that the amount stipulated for can 
be construed as damages contemplated or reasonably to be 
anticipated from the breach thereof. Otherwise, and in the 
event the damages are in excess of what it can be said was 
reasonably to be contemplated by the parties as flowing 
from a breach, the amount fixed becomes a penalty which 
the courts have refused to enforce. These are elementary 
and familiar principles of the law of damages. If we as-
sume, as plaintiff says, that the contract contains a stipula-
tion for damages and that the damages are "all time lost" 
and nothing more, so that even though one earned in other 
employment far in excess of what his wages may have 
amounted to, he may still recover the full amount of his 
wages, then it is not the kind of stipulation in the contract 
which courts will enforce. It is a penalty and nothing else. 
Such an interpretation as plaintiff would apply destroys 
the character of the expression "pay for all time lost" as a 
valid stipulation for liquidated damages. The contract does 
not provide for liquidated damages as awarded and as con-
tended for by plaintiff. It provides, and we reiterate, that 
if "dismissal is found to be unjust, yardmen shall be re-
instated and paid for all time lost." It contemplates pay-
ment for "all time lost" only in the event the plaintiff is 
returned to service. It necessarily follows that unless he is 
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returned to service he is not entitled to any time lost within 
the contemplation or the terms of this collective bargaining 
agreement. As pointed out in our main brief, the Railroad 
Adjus~ment Board has on occasion required the payment of 
all time lost upon reinstatement being ordered, but it has 
just as frequently refused to order the carrier to pay for all 
time lost-sometimes ordering a portion of the time lost 
to be paid, sometimes ordering reinstatement without any 
requirement that the employe be paid for time lost. But one 
will search in vain for a case where it has ordered payment 
of any lost time without ordering reinstatement. It does 
not have such jurisdiction. Carrier-employe contracts do 
not contemplate or provide for such a result, that is, an 
award of damages without reinstatement. The right to 
damages lies only in the law. It exists because of the rela-
tionship of employer and employe. That is why the Supreme 
Court of the United States in the Slocum case held the dis-
missed employe has a common law right of action in the 
courts, but nothing else. It may be thought that the de-
fendant cannot complain because only a part of the penalty is 
imposed upon it in requiring it to pay the plaintiff for all 
time lost without reinstatement. This is not sound, how-
ever, because the payment for time lost is dependent upon 
reinstatement. It is quite apparent that the penalty imposed 
upon a carrier to pay for "all time lost" was contemplated 
only in the event the employe had been wronged to the ex-
tent that he was to be exonerated completely or in part and 
returned to his employment. The plaintiff in this case never 
sought reinstatement at the hands of the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, and although his counsel resents our referring 
to the matter, there cannot be any doubt but that the 
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reason therefor was his lack of confidence in getting the 
very charitably disposed Railroad Adjustment Board tore-
instate him, which would also have meant no award of 
damages. This was particularly true in view of the fact that 
the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, the other party 
to this contract with the defendant, believed that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to reinstatement or at least this union 
refused, as we offered to prove, to consent to reinstating the 
plaintiff. As pointed out in our main brief in the case of 
Eubanks v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co., (Texas) 59 S. 
W. 2d 825, the expression "pay for all time lost" means 
nothing more, and at the most as therein stated, than an 
obligation of the railroad company to pay such damages 
as are occasioned by lost earnings. To place thereon the 
construction contended for by plaintiff would be to give 
this provision the character of a penalty and not one for 
liquidated damages reasonably contemplated by the parties 
for breach. 
POINT V. 
The agreement here provided that, "Reinstatement will 
not be permitted after the expiration of six months from date 
of dismissal, unless agreeable to the management and the 
general committee , * * * ." We offered to prove that the 
general committee meant the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men. The plaintiff in his brief, at page 42, contends that 
this provision relates to a situation where the dismissal was 
"rightful." The above quoted provision of the contract 
makes no such distinction and when the on-the-property 
operation of this contract between the carrier on one side, 
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and the union with its philosophy of seniority on the other 
side, is considered, it seems clear to us that no such distinc-
tion was intended. The plaintiff says, "Upon reinstatement 
an employee assumes his former seniority rating." In point 
of fact this is sometimes true and sometimes it is not true 
and it is not determined necessarily by the question of 
whether or not an employe was rightfully or wrongfully dis-
missed. Many men are rightfully dismissed from service 
and are thereafter returned to service by the company of its 
own accord, and sometimes because it is so ordered by the 
Railroad Adjustment Board. Sometimes they are restored to 
seniority rights, and sometimes they are returned to work 
with impaired seniority rights, which is simply one method 
of imposing penalty. There is no evidence of the fact, but it 
would seem reasonable to suppose that this provision was 
placed in the contract at the solicitation of the union. Cer-
tainly, the carrier would have no object in insisting upon 
the provision. Evidently the union insisting upon such a 
provision considered that six months was ample time for an 
employe to present to them, so that they could present to the 
company, an application for reinstatement. The union did 
not want an employe who had a clear right of reinstate-
ment to remain off the job indefinitely, thus acquiring sen-
iority to the prejudice of other employes, without earning it, 
and then to be reinstated at any time in the future that suited 
his convenience. The defendant in this case entered into 
a binding engagement with the BofRT on this matter and it 
is binding upon the plaintiff in this action. We say that we 
could not have reinstated the plaintiff without the consent 
of the BofRT had we so desired without breaching this con-
tract and giving rise to a cause of action against us by every 
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man who was set down one place on the seniority roster be-
cause of such action. We said in our main brief, and we 
say again, that we were "maintaining the integrity of the 
agreement" in refusing to reinstate the plaintiff under all 
the circumstances and in view of this provision of the con-
tract, and are content to leave it to this court to say whether 
or not such an argument is "frivolous": as characterized 
by plaintiff's counsel. This is simply another instance of the 
plaintiff seeking to hold the defendant strictly to account 
on a portion of the contract and at the same time urging 
that the defendant can disregard other provisions of the 
contract, procedural as well as substantive, when it would 
relieve the plaintiff of his own default. We think that we 
are bound by all the provisions of the contract, including 
the provisions which are purely procedural, and we think 
the plaintiff is likewise bound by all of the provisions of the 
contract. 
POINT VI. 
We here contended that the plaintiff was without any 
right to maintain an action for breach of the contract, but 
argued that if such a right at the time plaintiff commenced 
E-is action did exist he was estopped from asserting the sam~. 
Plaintiff says in his brief that, "Apparently two proposi-
tions are involved. First, that Mr. McDaniels in writing 
the defendant as he did under date of May 14, 1944 (De-
fendant's Exhibit 3) in effect released the defendant from 
any liability to plaintiff, and second, if that letter did not 
constitute a release, plaintiff's failure to prosecute any 
further claim until May 22, 1949, when this action was 
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commenced, effected an estoppel." We may be at fault for 
not making it clear in our main brief that under Point VI 
we were asserting two propositions, and we would like to 
make it clear at this time that we do contend first, that the 
defendant was released from any liability to the plaintiff 
because of what amounted to an agreement between the 
parties to consider the controversy as closed and settled, and 
secondly, if such was not the result of the termination of 
negotiations between the parties, then the plaintiff is now 
estopped to maintain this action. 
Much of plaintiff's brief on these two points is con-
cerned with the alleged lack of authority of Mr. McDaniels, 
Acting Vice President of the Switchmen's Union of North 
America, to represent the plaintiff. It is claimed particularly 
that McDaniels had no authority to advise the defendant that 
the grievance was being withdrawn and that the defendant 
might treat the matter as closed. We cannot agree with 
counsel in his statement that, "The broadest scope of an 
agency of the type here involved is that which exists be-
tween an attorney and client." The relationship of attorney 
and client is an agency which is peculiarly inhibited by 
custom, ethics and statutory law. The relationship between 
the plaintiff and Mr. McDaniels was an agency in its broad-
est sense. We are not relying upon any implied authority 
in McDaniels to admit that the plaintiff falsified at the hear-
ing, to withdraw the grievance and advise us that the case 
was closed. McDaniels was expressly authorized in writing 
by the plaintiff Russell as his "agent and representative in 
the prosecution of the grievance claimed," to handle all 
"further prosecution of the grievance," and to "negotiate, 
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adjust and dispose of the grievance claim in any manner." 
At no time did the plaintiff ever make any attempt to re-
voke this authority, as of course he had a right to do. He 
never took the witness stand to deny McDaniels' authority, 
or limit it in any way, nor to speak out in his own defense 
at the trial when publicly charged with false testimony 
and fraudulent conduct. 
We think that the forebearance on the part of the de-
fendant to progress its dispute before the Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, as it had a right to do, after it was advised 
that it might treat the plaintiff's case as closed, consti-
tutes consideration and is adequate to support what is the 
equivalent of a binding release. 
But if the factual situation is such that it does not 
fit nicely into some common legal category we see no reason 
why it is not proper to urge, as we do, that the facts are 
such that in all equity and justice the plaintiff should be 
estopped from now maintaining this action. Upon a reread-
ing of our argument of our Point VI in the main brief we 
feel that we therein fully meet every argument plaintiff 
advances on this matter of estoppel. 
POINT VII. 
Whether the findings and conclusions are supported by 
competent evidence and the judgment supported by the 
findings and conclusions depends entirely upon the decision 
of the court on the matters that have already been argued. 
We will therefore not prolong this reply by a further dis-
cussion thereof. 
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CONCLUSION 
The importance of the decision in this case not only 
to the defendant, but to all employers and employes as well, 
who work under collective bargaining agreements, cannot 
be overestimated. In this particular instance the decision 
is not alone a matter for concern to the defendant carrier, 
but is of concern to the other party to the contract, the 
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, which we offered to 
prove is in agreement with the carrier on the propriety of 
defendant's refusal to reinstate the plaintiff. There is no 
controversy between the parties to this contract-the train-
men's union and the defendant company, although we 
admit the right of the individual employe to disagree. It 
is a matter of the utmost concern to the defendant carrier 
and will be to other carriers and other employers who main-
tain collective bargaining agreements to learn whether or 
not they still have the right to discipline employes, so long 
as they act in good faith in doing so. 
It might be helpful to the court if in conclusion we very 
briefly summarize what has transpired in this suit. The 
appeal involves not only the facts as they appear in the 
record, but the competency, materiality and propriety of 
much evidence which we offered and which was rejected. 
We think the defendant in this case did not have its day in 
court. The trial court first, over objection, admits in evi-
dence the hearsay and unsworn testimony given at the in-
vestigation; not for impeachment, not as an admission, not 
for any lawful purpose we can perceive, but as evidence of 
the truth of the facts therein stated. Based on this hearsay 
evidence, the trial court proceeds to decide that the plain-
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tiff was "not guilty" of the charge made against him and 
that the defendant breached the collective bargaining agree-
ment in dismissing him. This was all the evidence offered by 
plaintiff on the propriety of the dismissal and the court 
refused to hear a single word of evidence from the defend-
ant on the subject. For all we know, the court may have 
decided that plaintiff was "not guilty"-"beyond a reason-
able doubt," or guilt was not established by a "preponder-
ance of the evidence." It is perhaps immaterial, for certainly 
the court did not ask itself as it should-does the record 
show that the defendant has acted arbitrarily or in bad 
faith, or its decision would have been otherwise. Assuming, 
of course, that the court had the right, which we deny, to 
decide the case on the bare record of the investigation. Thus 
convicting the defendant without any opportunity whatso-
ever to be heard, the court turns to the question of damages. 
Without any evidence thereon offered by the plaintiff, who 
had the burden to prove his damages, and with only our 
stipulation that plaintiff could have worked every day had 
he so desired, the court gives the plaintiff his gross wages for 
the full period of time-365 days a year. The "period" is 
over four and a half years and not over five years, as we 
inadvertently stated in our main brief, and which minuscule 
error on our part was resented by counsel. So much, and 
that is all, for plaintiff's case. 
After thus deciding the case prima facie in favor of 
the- plaintiff, the court refused to allow the defendant to 
introduce any evidence on the question of damages. The 
court refused to allow as a deduction the sum of $7,77 4.39, 
the amount proved without contradiction to have been earned 
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by plaintiff in other employment. The court refused to give 
any consideration to the fact shown by the transcript itself 
that the plaintiff worked a total of only 62 days in the first 
six months of 1945 preceding his dismissal. The court re-
fused to permit a showing that the plaintiff worked less 
than half-time at any time during his employment with the 
defendant since the year 1941 as having a bearing on the 
probabilities of his working every day, 365 days a year, from 
August, ·1945, to September, 1950. The court refused to per-
mit a showing by Dr. Keith Stratford, company doctor, that 
plaintiff falsified at the hearing relative to the nature and 
extent of his alleged illness. The court refused to permit 
the defendant to show that the plaintiff had falsified as to 
his engaging in lucrative outside employment during the 
10-day period involved in the investigation and during 
which he claimed he was ill, "right down in bed." The court 
refused to admit on this phase of the case, or at least re-
fused to take into consideration, the plaintiff's own ad-
mission that his "testimony" given at the official investiga-
tion was false. The court refused to permit defendant to 
prove that the union, the Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men, sole bargaining agent and the other party with the 
defendant to the contract, was never agreeable to reinstate-
ment of this man at any time, which was a necessary require-
ment under the contract and which was occasioned by plain-
tiff's own delay in petitioning for reinstatement. And last, 
and to our minds most important of all, the court disregarded 
the fact that the parties had, in keeping with the underlying 
concept of the Railway Labor Act, adjusted their differ-
ences between themselves pursuant to a negotiated contract. 
The latter again involved the court's complete disregard of 
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the plaintiff's own admission that he had falsified at the 
hearing, and occupied an untenable position both at the hear-
ing and later in seeking reinstatement. It involved a total dis-
regard by the court of plaintiff's voluntary abandonment of 
his claim and his assurance given to defendant that the 
claim was withdrawn and the case closed. 
It is incredible. No system of law, no body of rules 
or principles, which makes any pretension to distinguishing 
right from wrong, to working justice between men, to main-
taining social control, can countenance such an intolerable 
travesty as is reflected in the disposition of this case. It is 
not merely erroneous in law, it is monstrous and immoral. 
We respectfully submit that the case should be re-
manded to the District Court with instructions to enter j udg-
ment in favor of the defendant of "no cause of action." 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
10 South Main Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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